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# United States Space Command: Progress and Opportunities

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The mission of the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) – “to conduct operations in, from, and to space to deter conflict and if necessary defeat aggression, deliver space combat power to the Joint/Combined Force, and defend U.S. vital interests with allies and partners” – is essential to U.S. national security and economic well-being. Since being reestablished in August 2019, USSPACECOM has made significant progress developing the operational and contingency plans, solidifying domestic and international partnerships, and operating the forces and equipment necessary to effectively protect and defend America’s vital interests in space. During this period, USSPACECOM Commanders General Jay Raymond and General James Dickinson and the Command’s dedicated team of military, civilian, and contractor professionals have accomplished a great deal, including reaching Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in August 2021. (IOC indicates that the Command is able to execute key tasks assigned by the President under the *Unified Command Plan* and is capable of delivering strategic effects to achieve national objectives.) Still, additional work is needed to enable USSPACECOM to reach its full operational capability goals.

This paper highlights some of the key challenges and opportunities facing USSPACECOM and encourages the President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Secretary of the Air Force, Chief of Space Operations, Director of National Intelligence, Members of Congress, and others to provide the financial, personnel, materiel and other resources in support of USSPACECOM, given the increasing importance of the Command’s mission. Simply stated, an urgent and holistic effort is needed to address the issues raised in this paper to ensure USSPACECOM can effectively promote, protect, and defend America’s vital interests in space.

### Departmental Space Policy and Strategy

The Biden administration is conducting a “Space Strategic Review.” Such a review should result in promulgation of actionable policy and strategy that informs and guides the Command’s activities. In this regard, the National Security Space Association (NSSA) recently sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines that lists topics that should be addressed as part of the review.[1] These include bolstering deterrence, updating rules for the use of force in space, enhancing intelligence support, rationalizing operational decision-making processes, modernizing the space system acquisition process, and strengthening international cooperation. USSPACECOM officials should continue to actively engage in review deliberations, ensuring that the space warfighter’s perspective is appropriately represented in interagency discussions.

The lack of integrated strategic direction hinders the Command’s ability to effectively plan and execute operations to achieve U.S. objectives in the space domain. Hence, updated policy guidance on foundational topics impacting the USSPACECOM mission is urgently needed. For example, Department of Defense (DoD) policy on offensive and defensive space control is outdated and does not reflect modern conditions such as increasingly sophisticated adversary space and counterspace threats. Here, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy should lead an effort to develop updated space control policy for approval by the Secretary of Defense. Such updated policy guidance can be used to shape USSPACECOM’s plans and operations and help inform Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 program and budget deliberations. The revised guidance should

be briefed to the Congressional defense committees.

In addition, the Command would benefit greatly from updated policy guidance on the classification of national security space systems and associated security governance and management reform. As noted in an NSSA report entitled *Establish Governance and Align Security Policies and Programs to Enable National Security Space Missions*:

The U.S. government has not yet systematically addressed [space system] security governance or services... Current and former senior U.S. officials have observed that security is often an impediment rather than an enabler of national security space missions. The critique includes, among other things: over-classification of programs; too many stove-piped classified networks; overextended industrial-age security services that do not keep pace and adversely impact program cost and schedule; obstacles to sharing intelligence, technical, and operational information across the U.S. space sectors as well as with allies and partners; barriers to establishing credible deterrence and reassurance against space threats; and obstructions to planning, modeling and simulation, training, exercising, and conducting joint, interagency, and combined space operations. The imperative to deter the threat or use of force in space, acquire advanced capabilities that outpace the threat and sustain U.S. comparative advantages in space, and plan and execute space operations to deter or if necessary prevail in a conflict involving space, provides an unprecedented opportunity for the federal government to work together and with the private sector in novel ways to address security challenges and opportunities.[2]

USSPACECOM leaders should continue to advocate for updated and rationalized space system security policy, related governance reforms, and classification guidance to enable holistic and risk-managed national security space system development, planning, testing activities, exercises and operations. The Deputy Secretary of Defense should issue updated guidance on space system classification policy and associated security governance and management reforms. And the Congress should hold senior Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC) officials accountable for instituting holistic, risk-managed reforms in this area.

#### Service Capability Development and Force Design

USSPACECOM is supported by components from each of the Services. While the U.S. Space Force (USSF) will deliver the lion's share of capability for the Command, it is worth emphasizing that space security is a Joint fight -- indeed, every Service needs to understand the risks in the space domain and be prepared to deliver appropriate capabilities to protect and defend U.S. interests in space.

As noted, USSPACECOM relies on the USSF for the majority of capabilities that underpin the Command's vital missions. In general, such support has been forthcoming, although it should be noted that the USSF itself is still maturing and requires continued strong support to reach its full potential as a separate military Service within the Department of the Air Force. At the same time, closer alignment between USSPACECOM and the USSF is needed in key areas.

For example, General Dickinson has testified to Congress that his top priority – and number one shortfall – is achieving a robust Space Domain Awareness (SDA) posture. Fielding a broad suite of effective SDA systems and capabilities will enhance the Command’s understanding of the increasingly contested space operational environment, to include what is occurring and when, and understanding the intent behind those engaged in such actions. Attribution is needed to inform policy and operational decisions. There are two key elements associated with this challenge. First is the recognition that SDA extends beyond the need to detect, track, monitor, and catalog objects in orbit around the Earth and instead requires a broader range of capabilities to understand the adversary in depth, to include their intentions, patterns of life, technical characteristics of on-orbit spacecraft, as well as how those adversaries might be deterred. Second, USSPACECOM, the USSF, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and other organizations must determine how to better leverage commercial, scientific, academic, and international capabilities to conduct the SDA mission. Of note, NSSA recently published a report entitled *Leveraging Commercial Space Capabilities for National Security* which included actionable recommendations in this area.[3]

To ensure that USSPACECOM obtains the necessary tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination capabilities to perform timely and effective SDA, the Commander of USSPACECOM should request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD/I&S) and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence (PDDNI) sponsor Issue Papers, as part of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2024 Program Objective Memorandum process, that provide resourcing options to rapidly deliver enhanced SDA capabilities to the Command. In addition, the Congress should add funds to the USSF budget in the FY 2023 authorization and appropriations bills to effectively address the Command’s urgent need for enhanced SDA, including substantial funding dedicated to leveraging existing SDA capabilities from U.S. commercial space companies and for the rapid and cost-effective launch of satellites performing SDA missions. Likewise, funds should be added directly to the USSPACECOM budget so as to enable rapid experimentation and exercising with a broad range of commercial and other SDA capabilities.

Furthermore, closer collaboration is needed between USSPACECOM and the USSF in the area of space architectural analysis and capability development. At present, force design analyses of the USSF’s Space Warfighting Analysis Center (SWAC) are being used to inform key decisions on major programs and architectures across various mission areas. (The SWAC is a USSF unit responsible for conducting analyses, modeling and simulations, wargaming and experimentation to create operational concepts and force design guidance for the Service.)

SWAC force design analyses should be conducted in close coordination with USSPACECOM. Both organizations would benefit from tighter integration in areas such as threat assessments used to inform SWAC analyses and efforts to ensure the mission needs of both USSF and USSPACECOM are addressed in future force design efforts. This is especially the case given that the Command’s operational requirements and plans are integrated with the plans of other Combatant Commands and the Joint Force. In this regard, the Commander of USSPACECOM, the Chief of Space Operations, and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration should take steps to ensure enhanced collaboration between USSPACECOM and the SWAC. And the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should direct that future SWAC-

generated force design analyses for national security space systems and architectures meet Joint Force requirements.

In addition, the Secretary of Defense should direct the Commander of USSPACECOM to identify Joint Force space capability needs as part of the Integrated Priorities List (IPL) and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) processes. (IPLs are submitted annually by Combatant Commands and focus on prioritized capability gaps associated with validated or proposed capability requirements that limit the Commander's ability to successfully achieve assigned roles, functions and missions. The JCIDS process seeks to ensure the capabilities required by the joint warfighter are identified, along with their associated operational performance criteria (requirements), in order to successfully execute the various assigned missions.)

### Intelligence Support

Significant progress has been made over the past several years in DoD-IC space collaboration and intelligence support. For example, closer alignment has been achieved among USSPACECOM, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the U.S. Space Force including the signing of a "Protect and Defend Strategic Framework", and cooperation has been enhanced in other sensitive areas.

USSPACECOM intelligence personnel needs were established through a rigorous "strategy-to-task" analysis, and personnel and other resources continue to flow into the Command's Intelligence Directorate (J2) and National Agency support teams. At the same time, Defense Intelligence enterprise support to USSPACECOM can be strengthened in key areas. For example, uncertainty still exists as to which Defense or National intelligence organization(s) will provide various types of intelligence support to the Command, and the Command's J2 staff requires additional training and support to achieve proficiency in operational intelligence (OPINTEL). These matters should be resolved in accordance with IC policy and responsibilities, and plans should be developed to assure the Command's intelligence officers get the required training needed to stay ahead of the growing threats to U.S. national security space systems and networks.

Addressing these issues should be a priority task of senior DoD and IC leaders. Here, the USD(I&S) and PDDNI should jointly conduct a review of space OPINTEL requirements, determine which Defense and National Intelligence organizations should be responsible for providing personnel and other support to USSPACECOM, and allocate additional resources, as necessary, to the various Defense Intelligence organizations providing essential support in order to assure that USSPACECOM intelligence officers achieve proficiency in space OPINTEL.

### Cybersecurity

General Dickinson recently testified that "There is no space operation that does not rely on cyberspace. These two domains are inseparably linked. From a space resiliency perspective, a failure with cybersecurity will almost certainly result in a failure in space.... As a result,

cybersecurity funding is critical to maintaining dominance, not only in the space domain but all domains. Future years will require a steadfast resourcing approach to accomplish these objectives in order to ensure the U.S. can compete and mitigate evolving and expanding cybersecurity threats.” He further noted the importance of implementing a zero trust architecture, expanding partnerships with the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), and other proactive measures to address cyber vulnerabilities.

Senior DoD and IC leaders should take steps to transform current space system acquisition and sustainment processes to address cyber vulnerabilities. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Commander of Space Systems Command, and heads of other space system acquisition organizations should issue guidance to ensure that the quality and effectiveness of cyber security features incorporated into new space systems is included as an evaluated metric in future acquisition decisions. In addition, the Commanders of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM should develop and implement a “Space Operations Cyber Resiliency Strategy and Test Plan” to achieve enhanced cyber hardening and resilience of U.S. national security space systems and associated links and networks.

In light of growing concerns about nation-state cyber attacks on U.S. Government networks and critical infrastructures (including the Defense Industrial Base), additional funding for space system cyber threat mitigation programs and offensive and defensive cyber operations is urgently needed to accelerate such activities and strengthen the Command’s overall cybersecurity posture. In this regard, the DoD Comptroller should prepare and submit a reprogramming request to add funds to the FY 2022 budget for cyber resilience and hardening of USSPACECOM networks and infrastructure. For its part, the Congress should add significant resources to the FY 2023 budgets of USSPACECOM, USCYBERCOM and NSA to bolster the cyber resilience and hardening of USSPACECOM networks and request a briefing by USSPACECOM, USCYBERCOM and NSA on future plans and budgets to ensure cyber security of USSPACECOM networks and associated critical infrastructure.

### Global Warfighting Integration

In his Fiscal Year 2023 Posture Statement, General Dickinson highlighted the importance of integrating space capabilities and operations with other Combatant Commands. In this regard, he noted that the Command has created Joint Integrated Space Teams to promote operational integration, intelligence collaboration, and exercise support. Furthermore, recent “Warfighter Talks” have been conducted involving USCYBERCOM and USSPACECOM personnel. These and other cross-domain and cross-Command integration efforts are important and should be expanded. For example, the Commander of USSPACECOM should reestablish the Senior Warfighter Forum (SWARF) previously used to identify issues, priorities, and capability and resources mismatches (gaps, shortfalls, and redundancies) and facilitate collaboration with the other Combatant Commands on space matters. Alignment of these activities with the IC is paramount. In addition, the process of coordinating space-related requirements across the Combatant Commands should be formalized.

To address these issues and concerns, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of USSPACECOM and other Combatant Commanders should prioritize and formalize greater synchronization of space, kinetic, cyber, and other capabilities and effects in planning guidance and senior-level reviews of the operational and contingency plans of the Combatant Commands, including USSPACECOM. The Congressional defense committees should request a briefing from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the status of efforts to accelerate and broaden cross-domain and cross-Command integration and synchronization in military planning and operations.

### Warfighting Culture

Inculcating a warfighting culture and ethos in America's space warriors is imperative. An NSSA *White Paper on Space Warfighting Culture* by Lieutenant General Kevin McLaughlin (USAF, Ret.) addressed various aspects of this critical effort as it applies to both the USSF and USSPACECOM.[4] It is worth noting that much of the USSPACECOM culture is derived from legacy organizations which had a significant emphasis on providing space force enhancement in a more benign threat environment. The mission, ethos and operational posture of those organizations was different than that needed for today's space warfighting combatant command. In addition, many of the intelligence units that were transferred to USSPACECOM's Intelligence (J2) Directorate were focused on scientific & technical intelligence or foundational intelligence. Transitioning to a focus on OPINTEL in order to support space deterrence and warfighting missions is not easy, takes time, and requires operators with enhanced skill sets.

Given the growth in the numbers, types, and sophistication of adversary space and counterspace capabilities, it is vital for a warfighting-centric ethos and culture to take root across the Command. Significant progress has been made in this effort but additional work is needed. This requires additional education and training as well as continued refinement of the Command's approach to warfighting culture. Here, the Commander of USSPACECOM should issue a set of goals, objectives and metrics for achieving a space warfighting culture at the Command. Such an initiative should be closely aligned with similar, vitally important space warfighting culture-focused efforts in the USSF and other Services.

### Resourcing and Manpower Support

USSPACECOM's initial resourcing and manpower levels were based on a desire to keep the Command "lean and efficient." Yet, there is a fine line between "lean" and "unable to perform the mission due to inadequate resources". This applies equally to personnel staffing requests and financial matters. Here, senior Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials should expedite approval of manpower requests for USSPACECOM and the Service Secretaries should develop and assign appropriately qualified personnel to the Command. For its part, the Congress should consider requesting an annual briefing from USSPACECOM and OSD officials on progress in meeting Command manpower needs.

In addition, Congress should fully support the Command's unfunded priority requirements requests. On April 4th of this year General Dickinson submitted to Congress a list of unfunded

priority requirements for USSPACECOM for Fiscal Year 2023. This list included items such as “Consolidated Space Operations Facility Fit-Out”, “National Space Defense Center Interim Facility Renovations” and “Service Shortfalls in Support of Joint Task Force - Space Defense”. These requests are meritorious and deserve support from the Congressional defense committees.

Furthermore, like all other national security organizations, USSPACECOM suffers greatly from having to operate under repeated Continuing Resolutions (CRs). The constraints imposed by CRs stifle productivity, delay fielding of needed capabilities, and inhibit effective planning and operations. Congressional leaders from both parties should take steps to ensure that the National Defense Authorization Act, the Intelligence Authorization Act, and the Department of Defense Appropriations Act are completed and signed into law prior to October 1, 2022.

### Training, Exercises, and Experimentation

Other Combatant Commands have made major strides in maturing their operations by conducting exercises with Joint, interagency, coalition, and industry partners and experimenting with new concepts and capabilities. USSPACECOM must continue and where appropriate expand its training, exercising, and experimentation programs to more rapidly advance relevant capabilities and concepts associated with its space deterrence and warfighting mission. This will require robustly resourcing the Command organizations responsible for these important functions as well as supporting exercises and experimentation with novel concepts and capabilities. Here, the USSPACECOM Commander should direct the development of resource-informed plans for the infrastructure and ranges needed to support training, exercising, and experimentation activities, and the DoD leadership and Congress should approve those plans and resource requests. Finally, USSPACECOM should partner with the Joint Staff to define a robust set of realistic exercises and continue the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-led Table Top exercises focused on space operations in a contested environment.

USSPACECOM must also continue to focus considerable attention and resources on developing proficiency at the tactical warfighting level. Here, the Commander of USSPACECOM should direct continued maturation of concepts of operation (CONOPs) and operational procedures needed to conduct effective Joint and coalition operations against adversaries who possess sophisticated space and counterspace capabilities and conduct increasingly complex on-orbit operations. Those CONOPs and operational procedures must be exercised regularly to gain proficiency and generate lessons learned that can flow back into the requirements process for new capabilities and more advanced training and exercises. The results of such efforts should be shared with U.S. industry to facilitate feedback among operators, developers, and industry and accelerate development of new capabilities, particularly in the area of battle management, command, control and communications (BMC3) systems.

### Headquarters Basing Decision

Perhaps the most visible issue facing USSPACECOM is the pending decision on where the Command headquarters will be based. (Colorado Springs is the provisional home for USSPACECOM through at least 2026.) Continued uncertainty in this area negatively impacts

efforts to recruit and retain the personnel and put in place the facilities needed to perform the Command's vital mission. A final decision on this matter is needed soon.

#### References

- [1] [https://www.nssaspace.org/files/ugd/d945b8\\_96895ef0fa8449978014b9a440f972df.pdf](https://www.nssaspace.org/files/ugd/d945b8_96895ef0fa8449978014b9a440f972df.pdf)
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## Summary of Recommendations

**Policy and Strategy** -- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy should ensure that updated DoD space control policy is submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval. The Deputy Secretary of Defense should issue updated guidance on space system classification policy and associated security governance and management reforms.

**Service Capability Development and Force Design** - The Commander of USSPACECOM should request that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence sponsor Issue Papers, as part of the FY 2024 Program Objective Memorandum process, that provide resourcing options to rapidly deliver enhanced Space Domain Awareness capabilities to the Command. The Commander of USSPACECOM, the Chief of Space Operations, and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration should take steps to enhance collaboration between USSPACECOM and the Space Warfighting Analysis Center. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should direct that future SWAC-generated force design analyses for national security space systems and architectures meet Joint Force requirements. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Commander of USSPACECOM to identify Joint Force space capability needs as part of the Integrated Priorities List and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System processes.

**Intelligence Support** - The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence should jointly conduct a review of space operational intelligence (OPINTEL) requirements, determine which Defense and National Intelligence organizations should be responsible for providing personnel and other support to USSPACECOM, and allocate additional resources, as necessary, to the various Defense Intelligence organizations providing essential support in order to assure that USSPACECOM intelligence officers achieve proficiency in space OPINTEL.

**Cybersecurity** - The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Commander of Space Systems Command, and heads of other acquisition organizations should issue guidance to ensure that the quality and effectiveness of cybersecurity features incorporated into new systems is included as an evaluated metric in future acquisition decisions. The Commanders of USSPACECOM and USCYBERCOM should jointly develop a "Space Operations Cyber Resiliency Strategy and Test Plan" to achieve enhanced cyber hardening and resilience in U.S. national security space systems and associated links and networks. The DoD Comptroller should prepare and submit a reprogramming request to add funds to the FY 2022 budget for cyber resilience and hardening of USSPACECOM networks and infrastructure.

**Global Warfighting Integration** - The Commander of USSPACECOM should reestablish the Senior Warfighter Forum (SWARF) previously used to identify issues, priorities, and capability and resources mismatches and facilitate expanded collaboration with the other Combatant Commands on space matters. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of USSPACECOM and other Combatant Commanders

should prioritize and formalize greater synchronization of space, kinetic, cyber, and other capabilities and effects in Department-wide planning guidance and senior-level reviews of the operational and contingency plans of the Combatant Commands. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Commander of U.S. Space Command to formally identify Joint Force space capability needs as part of the Integrated Priorities List and Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System processes.

**Space Warfighting Culture** - The Commander of USSPACECOM should issue a set of goals, objectives and metrics for achieving a space warfighting culture at the Command. Such an initiative should be closely aligned with similar culture-focused efforts in the U.S. Space Force and other Services.

**Resourcing and Manpower Support** - Senior Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials should expedite approval of manpower requests for USSPACECOM and the Service Secretaries should develop and assign appropriately qualified personnel to the Command.

**Training, Exercises and Experimentation** - The Commander of USSPACECOM should direct the development of resource-informed plans for the infrastructure needed to support training, exercising, and experimentation activities, and the Department's leadership should approve those plans and resource requests. USSPACECOM should partner with the Joint Staff to define a robust set of realistic exercises and sustain the Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-led Table Top Exercises focused on space operations in a contested environment. The Commander of USSPACECOM should direct continued maturation of concepts of operation (CONOPs) and operational practices needed to conduct effective Joint operations against adversaries who possess sophisticated space and counterspace capabilities and conduct increasingly complex on-orbit operations.

**Headquarters Basing Decision** - The Department of Defense should expeditiously complete the process of determining the location of the USSPACECOM headquarters.

#### **Issues for Congress:**

The Congressional defense and intelligence committees should consider the following actions as part of their consideration on the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, Intelligence Authorization Act, and Department of Defense Appropriations Act:

- Request a briefing by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy on updated offensive and defensive space control policy.
- Request a briefing by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, and the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence on updated guidance on space system classification policy and associated security governance and management reforms.
- Add resources to the USSF budget in Fiscal Year 2023 to effectively address the Command's urgent need for enhanced SDA, including substantial funding dedicated to leveraging existing SDA

capabilities from U.S. commercial space companies. In addition, funds should be added to the USSPACECOM budget so as to enable rapid experimentation and exercising with a broad range of commercial SDA capabilities.

- Add significant resources to the Fiscal Year 2023 budgets for USSPACECOM, USCYBERCOM and the National Security Agency to bolster the cyber resilience and hardening of USSPACECOM networks and associated infrastructure, and request a briefing by USSPACECOM, USCYBERCOM and the National Security Agency on future plans and budgets to ensure cyber security of USSPACECOM networks and associated critical infrastructure.
- Request an annual briefing from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the status of efforts to accelerate and broaden cross-domain and cross-Command integration and synchronization of military plans and operations.
- Fully fund the USSPACECOM Commander's unfunded priority requirements request for FY 2023.
- Request an annual briefing from USSPACECOM and Office of the Secretary of Defense officials on progress in meeting the Command's manpower needs.
- Congressional leaders from both parties should take steps to ensure that the annual National Defense Authorization Act, the Intelligence Authorization Act, and the Department of Defense Appropriations Act are signed into law prior to October 1, 2022.

*NSSA is the only U.S. trade association dedicated solely to promoting the health and vitality of the U.S. national security space enterprise (Title 10 and Title 50) and its supporting industry partners. For more information, including how to join the Association, please visit us at [www.nssaspace.org](http://www.nssaspace.org)*

*We thank you and our valued members for your continued support of the NSSA, and the preservation and protection of the*

*national security space community.*



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